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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:
:

Case No. 880378-CA

v.
:

RAYMOND ORTIZ,

: Category No.

Defendant-Appellant.

2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft by
deception, both second degree felonies, and was sentenced on
those convictions on May 10, 1988 (R. 72). Defendant filed his
notice of appeal in district court on June 3, 1988 (R. 74).
Under Rule 4(a) of this Court, and under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3, jurisdiction is proper in this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in
admitting evidence of defendant's prior convictions?
2. Do the prosecutor's comments mandate a reversal of
defendant's convictions?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are
provided as they arise in the text of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with two counts of
theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-405 (R.
14).

At defendant's arraignment, he pled not guilty (R. 17). On

January 22, 1988, defendant was bound over to district court (R.
2).
Trial was held on March 31, 1988 and April 1, 1988 (R.
27-30).

The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of theft

by deception on April 1, 1988 (R. 29).
On May 12, 1988, the trial court issued an order
indicating that the two counts of theft by deception would be
thereafter deemed one count, and punished as such (R. 70).
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in prison
(consecutively to a prior sentence), and ordered to pay $10,000
in restitution (R. 72).
Defendant filed his notice of appeal in district court
on June 3, 1988 (R. 74).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reginald Corona, the fifteen year owner of Reggie's
Rockin' R (T. 4), met defendant at Eagle Tire, next door to Mr.
Corona's business, in approximately July of 1987 (T. 5-6). At
that time, defendant told Mr. Corona that he had just bought
Eagle Tire (T. 6), and that he had done so through a loan from
the SBA (T. 7). After Mr. Corona expressed an interest in
obtaining a similar loan for purchasing a business in American
Fork, defendant told him that defendant knew someone who could
get an SBA loan for him (T. 7). Mr. Corona said that he was
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interested in a loan for between $350,000 and $400,000, and
defendant told him that in order to get the loan, Mr. Corona
would need to advance between $10,000 and $20,000 of his own
money to prove that he would complete the loan procedure (T. 8).
Defendant told Mr. Corona that defendant had advanced $10,000 to
get defendant's loan, and

from defendant's experience, with the

exception of the "points", Mr. Corona would get all of his
$10,000 back when he got the loan (T. 75). Mr. Corona then asked
defendant to inquire with defendant's contact about obtaining the
loan for Mr. Corona (T. 8).
A few days later, defendant and Mr. Corona had a
private meeting in which defendant indicated that his contact for
the loan would arrange for the loan (T. 9). It was agreed that
defendant would transfer the necessary documents between the
contact and Mr. Corona (T. 10). Defendant never told Mr. Corona
the contact's name, but did inform him that the contact
supervised the SBA loan department at Valley Bank (T. 9-10).
Later, defendant contacted Mr. Corona and said that he
needed $5,000 in advanced fees in order to complete the paperwork
for the loan (T. 10). Defendant asked that the $5,000 be
delivered to him in cash (T. 11). Mr. Corona got a cashier's
check for $5,000 from Tracy Collins Bank, making it payable to
defendant (T. 11-13).

When Mr. Corona later inquired, defendant

assured him that he had received the check, and that he had
spoken with the contact at Valley Bank (T. 15).
In August of 1987, Mr. Corona had his son deliver
another check to defendant, because defendant had told him that

another $5,000 would enable defendant and his contact to send the
loan papers to Denver (T. 15-17).

Mr. Corona wrote the second

cashier's check to Richard L. Gray (T. 18) because that name was
on the Valley Bank business card attached to the blank (T. 52)
loan papers defendant gave Mr. Corona to sign (T. 20). The
rooming after the second check was delivered to defendant,
defendant told Mr. Corona that Mr. Gray did not want his name
involved in the transaction, and that Mr. Corona should write a
substitute check, making it payable to defendant (T. 25-26).
When Mr. Corona provided the substitute check, defendant told him
he would guarantee the SBA loan (T. 27).
Some time after the delivery of the third check, Mr.
Corona spoke with defendant, who told him he needed a co-signer
on a loan to purchase Eagle Tire, a loan and transaction that
defendant had told Mr. Corona on the first day they met had
already gone through (T. 28). This aroused Mr. Corona's
suspicions, and he called Richard Gray at Valley Bank, only to
discover that Mr. Gray had no record of any loan application from
Mr. Corona (T. 29).
Mr. Corona inquired further of defendant concerning his
money and the loan, and defendant wrote a check to Mr. Corona for
$10,000, but there were no funds in the account drawn on to cover
the check (T. 63). When Mr. Corona informed defendant of this,
defendant brought Mr. Corona another check for $10,000, which was
also returned for insufficient funds (T. 63-64).

One day,

defendant told Mr. Corona that he was going right then to the
bank to get the money to cover the check, but defendant never
returned, leaving Mr. Corona waiting all day long (T. 64).
-4-

Mr, Corona never received an SBA loan as a result of
the transactions with defendant (T. 27), and never recovered his
$10,000 from defendant (T. 32).
Defendant also introduced Mr. Corona to a woman from
Atlanta, and told him that although the SBA loan was not
obtainable, she (Gerry Hancey-Hedderick) had contacts overseas
who would provide a loan (T. 42). Mr. Corona paid her $500 for
her expenses (T. 45). Mr. Corona never obtained a loan through
Gerry Hancey-Hedderick (T. 69).
Richard Gray, loan officer at Valley Bank (T. 80),
testified that standard procedures for obtaining SBA loans did
not include applicant advancement of $5,000 fees, and that he
received no loan fees from defendant or Mr. Corona (T. 85-86).
Carl W. Warnock, commercial loan specialist for the
Small Business Administration (T. 90), testified that he searched
all SBA loan applications during the months of July and August of
1987, and found none relating to Mr. Corona, to Reggie's Rockin'
R, or to defendant (T. 92). He also testified that $10,000 in
advanced fees it is not a prerequisite to application for an SBA
loan (T. 93).
Mr. Corona eventually obtained the SBA loan through a
Mr. Hansen, who charged him a total of $500 for application
assistance (T. 30-31).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant failed to obtain on the record a ruling from
the trial court on defendant's motion in limine seeking to
exclude evidence of defendant's prior crimes.

Thus, he is in no

position to object on appeal to the admission of the evidence
which he introduced.
If defendant were in a position to object on appeal to
the admission of the evidence of defendant's prior convictions
for theft by deception and for communications fraud, he would
fail in doing so, because evidence of both convictions is
automatically admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 because
the crimes involve dishonesty and/or false statement.

Were this

not the case, evidence of the crimes would still be admissible to
impeach defendant because the convictions bear on credibility,
because the convictions are recent, because credibility is a
major issue in this case, and because defendant had opportunities
of presenting his case other than through his own testimony.
The propriety of the prosecutor's comments during
closing arguments becomes apparent through an overview of the
entire case.

The facts that defendant's prior convictions were

discussed by defense counsel and the prosecution, and that these
attorneys and the court instructed the jurors that the
convictions were relevant only to credibility, and that the
evidence against defendant was strong support the trial court's
finding that the prosecutor's comments did not warrant a
mistrial.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED.
On March 25, 1988, defendant submitted a motion in
limine, seeking to exclude evidence of defendant's prior
conviction for communications fraud (R. 25). During oral
argument on the motion, the motion was extended to cover
defendant's prior conviction for theft by deception (Pretrial
Motions Transcript 3).
The trial court took this motion under advisement (T.
of pretrial motions of 3/31/88, 10), but there is no record that
the judge ever ruled on the motion.

Defense counsel was the

first to elicit testimony concerning the convictions:
Q. Now, you were — do you remember when you were
arrested and charged for this situation?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And about when was that?
A. November.
Q. Of what year?
A. Of 1987.
Q. Now, prior to November of '87, had you been
convicted of prior felonies?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And on or about June 27th of 1987, had you been
convicted of a communications fraud felony?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had you been convicted of a
theft by deception felony?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Had you ever communicated to Mr. Hansen anything
about your criminal record?
A. Yes he knew.
Q. Did he know about that?
A. Yes.
(T. 127-128).

Defendant's prior convictions were also raised

during cross-examination by the prosecution:

Q. And you didn't write out any checks before that
bounced because you can't — was it your testimony that
you can't have a checking account?
A. Yes. [T. 124].
Q. Why is that?
A. That was part of my parole agreement.
Q. Parole agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you've been previously convicted of
communications fraud in June of 1986; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Here in Salt Lake County?
A. Yes.
Q. And then a little bit more than a year later — a
little bit more than a year before, in August — a
little less than a year before in August of '85, you
were convicted of theft by deception?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Both of those felonies?
A. Yes.
Q. Both of those involving crimes regarding
dishonesty?
A. Yes.
Q. And you are on trial today for what crime?
A. Theft by deception.
(T. 133-134).
The jurors were instructed as follows:
You are instructed that the fact that a
witness had been convicted of a felony and/or
convicted of any crime involving dishonesty
or false statements is to be used by you only
in weighing his credibility, and it is to be
so used only if you find and believe that
such a fact indicates a person is more likely
to tell a falsehood.
(R. 50, instruction 10a).
On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of his
prior convictions.
A. Defendant Waived This Objection By Failing To
Give The Trial Court An Opportunity To Rule On
The Motion In Limine.
Because the trial judge in this case took defendant's
motion in limine concerning evidence of his prior convictions
under advisement, because there is no ruling on the motion in
-8-

limine in the record, and because defendant was the first to
present evidence of the convictions and did not object to the
introduction of that evidence, he has waived any claim of error
on appeal related to the admission of this evidence.

See Delong

v. State, 185 Ga.App. 314, 363 S.E.2d 811, 811-812 (1987)("The
court made no ruling on appellant's motion in limine, and when an
appellant fails to invoke a ruling on his motion, he has waived
the issue for purposes of appeal.") cert, denied 185 Ga.App. 909;
Soto v. State, 736 S.W.2d 823, 827-828 (Tex.App.-San Antonio
1987)("Error in the admission of testimony will not be preserved
by the filing of a motion in limine.

Objection must be made on

proper grounds at the very time the evidence complained of is
offered and a ruling must be secured from the court."); DeLeon v.
State, 758 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1988)("the record does not show that either motion was presented
to and ruled upon by the trial court.

Therefore, appellant has

failed to preserve this contention on appeal."); Boston v. State,
185 Ga.App. 740, 365 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1988)("While both motions
[to suppress and for severance] are contained in the record, we
find nothing in the record to show that the court ruled on the
motions other than a passing comment by counsel on his motion to
suppress, made in connection with objections to State exhibits.
Thus, there is nothing for us to review.") (emphasis added) cert,
denied Sept. 8, 1988); State v. Blair, 227 Neb. 742, 419 N.W.2d
868, 870-871 (1988)(because there was no record of a ruling on
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, and because defendant
failed to object at the time that the evidence was introduced,

issue of introduction of evidence subject of motion to suppress
was waived on appeal).

See also, State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43,

46 (Utah 1984)(court will not rule on matters outside the
record).
B. Evidence Of The Prior Convictions Was Admissible
Under Utah Rule Of Evidence 609, Subsection (2).
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988), this
Court defined the standard of review applicable in this case as
follows:
In reviewing evidentiary rulings, we "will
not reverse the trial court's ruling on
evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that
the court so abused its discretion that there
is a likelihood that injustice resulted."
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah
1987).
Wight at 16.
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988), this
Court discussed subsection (2) of Rule 609, and the controversy
concerning which crimes should be admissible thereunder.

In so

doing, this Court explained that some jurisdictions find that
property crimes such as theft bear on a witness's credibility,
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while other courts find that there is insufficient nexus between
credibility and property crimes. This discussion repeatedly
notes that even those courts which exclude evidence of property
crimes for purposes of impeachment will admit evidence of those
crimes if the crimes involve fraud and deception.

IcL at 17-18.

At defendant's trial, evidence was introduced showing
that defendant had been convicted of theft by deception and of
communications fraud, which are described as follows:
U.C.A. 76-6-405. Theft by deception.—(1) A
person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof....
U.C.A. 76-10-1801. Communications fraud.
(1) Any person who had devised any scheme
or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of
value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty
of . . .
Inasmuch as fraud and deceit are essential elements of
theft by deception and communications fraud, there is no need for
the trial court to have made a factual analysis of the crimes to
determine whether honesty factored into the crimes, and they were
automatically admissible under subsection (2) of Rule of Evidence
609.
1984).

See Wight at 18; State v. Cintronf 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah

C. Utah Rule Of Evidence 609 Subsection (1) And The
Gordon Factors Support The Admission Of The Prior
Convictions.
It appears from the record that the trial court never
had the opportunity of recognizing that defendant's prior
convictions involved dishonesty and/or false statement, because
after the court took defendant's motion in limine under
advisement, but before the court ruled on the motion, evidence of
the prior convictions was introduced by defense counsel.

If

defendant's convictions of theft by deception and communications
fraud were construed by this Court as inadmissible under
subsection (2) of Rule of Evidence 609 as a result of the trial
court's failure to inquire as to the underlying facts of the
2
3
crime, they should be found admissible under subsection (1).
_ Tracing the five factors to be considered in evaluating a
609(a)(1) case to their origin, from State v. Banner, 717 P.2d
1335 n. 44 (Utah 1986), to United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1185
n. 8, cert, denied 444 U.S. 1034 (1980), overrule recognized by
767 F.2d 574 (1985)(overrule recognition quoted in footnote 6 of
this brief), cert, denied 474 U.S. 953 (1953), to United States
v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976) cert, denied 429
U.S. 1025 (1976), to Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941
(D.C.Cir. 1967) cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), the State will
refer to these factors in this brief as "the Gordon factors".
2
See Wight at 18 ("In this case, it appears that no inquiry about
underlying facts was made. As a result, because we cannot
determine if the actual crime involved dishonesty or false
statement, we find that it was not admissible under 609(a)(2).").
This Court in Wight found the absence of record proof of the
trial court's having applied the Gordon factors as an indication
of error under Rule 609(a)(1), Wight at 19. However, numerous
appellate cases support the State's current contention that the
Gordon factors can be applied for the first time by appellate
courts. See e.g., State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah
1987)("Applying the factors we identified in Banner to the rape
and escape convictions, we conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to suppress them. The State did not
offer any discussion concerning the probative or prejudicial
aspects of defendant's prior convictions. However, we find that
the prejudicial character of the convictions outweighs their
-12-

As noted in Wight, the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), explained the factors to be
considered in evaluating the admissibility of evidence under
subsection (1) of Rule of Evidence 609:
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on
the character for veracity of the witness.
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the
prior conviction . . . .
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to
the charged crime, insofar as a close
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the
accused as a bad person.
[4] the importance of credibility issues
in determining the truth in a prosecution
tried without decisive nontestimonial
evidence....
[5] the importance of the accused's
testimony, as perhaps warranting the
exclusion of convictions probative of the
accused's character for veracity...
Banner at 1334 (footnote omitted).
Particularly when these factors are applied in this
case and compared with applications of the factors in other
cases, it becomes apparent that defendant's convictions for theft
by deception and communications fraud would have been admissible

Cont. possible probative value and that defendant should have
been able to testify in his own behalf without being crossexamined concerning them."); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d
1083, 1090 (7th Cir. 1981)(although trial judge did not
articulate rationale for admitting the evidence, record
demonstrated that Gordon factors were satisfied) cert, denied 451
U.S. 993 (1981).
Particularly in the circumstances of this case, in
which the trial court was apparently never given the opportunity
to deliver a ruling on the motion that he took under advisement,
this Court should address the application of the Gordon criteria
to this case, in the event that this Court seeks to analyze the
admission of prior convictions beyond their admissibility under
subsection (2) of Rule 609, in the event that this Court chooses
to address the issue beyond recongizing defendant's waiver
thereof.

under subsection (1) of Utah Rule of Evidence 609 (as well as
under subsection (2)).
1. The Nature Of The Crimes - Nexus To Veracity.
As discussed above, theft by deception and
communications fraud are directly relevant to the credibility of
a witness.

Compare this case with State v. Banner, 717 P.2d

1325, 1334-1335 (Utah 1986)("The crime of assault with intent to
commit rape does not inherently reflect on defendant's character
for truth and veracity.") and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032,
1037-38 (Utah 1987)("The crime of rape 'does not inherently
reflect on defendant's character for truth and
veracity....Likewise, the convictions for escape should have been
excluded because of ... the complete lack of connection between
the crime of escape and defendant's veracity.").
2. Recentness Of The Prior Crime
The convictions used to impeach defendant occurred in
August of 1985 and June of 1986 (T. 133-134), and his trial took
place in March and April of 1988. Certainly, the proximity in
time of the prior offenses to the date of the trial substantiates
the relevance of the prior offenses to defendant's credibility at
trial.

Compare this case with

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,

1335 (Utah 1986)("Particularly significant in our balancing
process is the remoteness of the prior convictions... the
convictions at the time of defendant's trial were between eight
and nine-plus years old.") and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032,
1037 (Utah 1987)("The rape conviction was ten years old at the
time of this trial.

The conviction's remoteness is a measure of

its negligible probative value.").
-14-

3. Similarity Of Crime Charged And Prior
Convictions
Of course, defendant's prior conviction for theft by
deception, and the charge of theft by deception in the instant
case are semantically identical.

Because the factual bases for

defendant's prior convictions of theft by deception and
communications fraud were not discussed during the hearing on the
motion in limine, or at any other time during defendant's trial,
and because the statutory language defining those crimes
encompasses a broad scope of behavior, it is difficult to say
that defendant's prior convictions closely resembled the theft by
deception at issue in this case, and led the jury to "punish the
accused as a bad person.11

See People v. Perez, 515 N.Y.S.2d 303,

303, 160 A.D.2d 595 (2 Dept. 1987)(defendant was charged with
criminal possession of a firearm, and prosecution properly
introduced evidence of prior convictions for attempted robbery:
"Moreover, since the facts of the instant crime and of the prior
crime were not similar, we find that the court's ruling did not
prevent the defendant from testifying at trial."); People v. Von
Everett, 156 Mich.App. 615, 402 N.W.2d 773, 775 (1986)("Those
crimes [breaking and entering, uttering and publishing] were not
substantially similar to the charged offense [armed robbery], nor
did they involve substantially the same conduct for which
defendant was on trial.") (brackets added);

State v. Banner, 717

P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986)(defendant was charged with sodomy on
a child and sexual abuse of a child; H[t]he two convictions were
for assault with intent to commit rape.

Such convictions would

be extremely prejudicial and tend to inflame the jury in any case
15-

dealing with sex crimes, particularly sex crimes involving a
child.").
3A. The Distinction Between Gordon Factors
Four And Five.
The fourth and fifth factors in the 609(a)(1) analysis,
-the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in
a prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence"
and "the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of the
accused's character for veracity" appear to be merged in Banner
4
and Gentry.
While, in some cases, these factors weigh equally,
and cancel each other out, reference to decisions from other
jurisdictions demonstrates that these two factors are

Banner at 1335 ("Finally, the accused's testimony and the
importance of credibility in this case were critical in
determining whose version of the facts was correct since the
prosecution's case included no decisive nontestimonial
evidence."); Gentry at 1037-1038 ("Finally, the State relied
heavily upon the testimonial evidence offered by the victim to
establish defendant's guilt. Defendant's testimony would have
been probative regarding the victim's credibility and possibly
influential in the trial's outcome.").
5
See United States v. Cueto, 506 F. Supp. 9, 14 (W.D. Olka.
1979)("Factors four and five seem to counterbalance each other in
this case. While Defendant's testimony may be of some
importance, a factor favoring nonadmission, at the same time his
credibility may be a central issue in this case, a factor
favoring admission."); United States v. Brewer, 451 F.Supp. 50,
54 (E.D.Tenn. 1978)("Factors four and five seem to counterbalance
each other in this case. While defendant's testimony may be of
some importance, a factor favoring nonadmission, at the same time
his credibility may be a central issue in the case, a factor
favoring admission."); United States v. D'Aqata, 646 F.Supp. 390,
393 (E.D.Pa. 1986)("Both sides agree that D'Agata's credibility,
should he testify, will be a crucial issue. The main evidence
against D'Agata is the testimony of a witness who claims he
discussed buying the stolen goods from defendant. Thus, the
credibility issue is central and D'Agata's testimony would be
important, which are considerations for both admitting and
excluding the evidence from each side's point of view.").
_i c_

distinguishable from one another, and further support the
admission of defendant's convictions in the instant case.
4. Importance Of Credibility Issue
In cases in which credibility is crucial (i.e. cases
lacking independent physical evidence, cases in which the
prosecution and defense cases hinge on testimony of conflicting
witnesses), the admission of prior convictions bearing on witness
credibility is essential.

See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d

936, 941 (D.C.Cir. 1967)("[the prior conviction] was received
because the case had narrowed to the credibility of two
persons —

the accused and his accuser —

and in those

circumstances there was greater, not less, compelling reason for
exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the two
witnesses was to be believed.

The jurors saw and heard both and

we are able to see and hear neither.") cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029
(6th Cir. 1968); United State v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1150
(1978)(after citing the five Gordon factors, the court noted that
the trial court's ruling admitting the evidence was based in part
on the fact that "defendant's credibility was 'essentially the
whole case'").
In the instant case, the physical evidence consisted of
originals and copies of the $5,000 cashier's checks from Mr.
Corona to defendant and Richard L. Gray, business cards for
Richard L. Gray and Gerry Hancey-Hedderick, a check from
defendant to Mr. Corona for $10,000, some blank loan applications
similar to those given to Mr. Corona by defendant, and a piece of
paper with some addresses on it (see Exhibits envelope).

_ 1 *7-

The

significance of this physical evidence in the evaluation of
defendant's intent is dependent upon the conflicting testimony of
defendant and Mr. Corona.

Because this case focused on the

conflicts between these two witnesses, the fourth factor of
Gordon supports the admission of defendant's prior convictions.
5. The Importance Of Defendant's Testimony To
His Case.
This Court can better understand the fifth factor, "the
importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the
exclusion of convictions probative of the accused's character for
veracity" after referring to the rationale behind it:
One important consideration is what the
effect will be if the defendant does not
testify out of fear of being prejudiced
because of impeachment by prior convictions.
Even though a judge might find that the prior
convictions are relevant to credibility and
the risk of prejudice to the defendant does
not warrant their exclusion, he may
nevertheless conclude that it is more
important that the jury have the benefit of
the defendant's version of the case than to
have the defendant remain silent out of fear
of impeachment. . . .
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-941 (D.C.Cir. 1967)
cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).

Thus, cases following the

The court in Gordon recommended that the application of the
five factor test follow a pretrial hearing at which the trial
judge
is to have the accused take the stand in a non-jury
hearing and elicit his testimony and allow cross
examination before resolving the [Rule 609] issue. Not
only the trial judge, but both counsel, would then be
in a better position to make decisions concerning the
impeachment issue. Of course, the defendant could not
be compelled to give testimony in the non-jury hearing
and his testimony would not be admissible in evidence
except for impeachment.
Id. at 941.
The application of the fifth factor of this test on appeal in
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Cont
this j u r i s d u t i o n is somewhat questionable,, i nasmuch as
Gentry ha& set no pretrial hearing standard, but has set as a
prerequisite to appeal of Rule 609 issues testimony by the
defendant. Jld. at 1036. Thus, the Gordon court's concern about
a Rule 609 evidentiary ruling's preventing a defendant from
testifying will no longer be a fact in any appeal before this
Court. See Luce v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 460 n.5
(1984)("Requiring a defendant to make a proffer of testimony is
no answer; his trial testimony could, for any number of reasons,
differ from the proffer.")? United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d
574, 578 (9th Cir. 1985)("At the time of Givens' trial, the law
of this circuit required that the defendant do two things to
preserve the issue for review: (l)establish on the record that
he will in fact take the stand and testify if his challenged
prior convictions are excluded, and (2) sufficiently outline tlte
nature of his anticipated testimony so that the trial court and
reviewing court can perform the balancing required by Rule
609«... Luce expressly overruled Cook on this point. Luce ] 015
S.Ct at 463 N.3 M ) cert, denied, 474 U.S 953 (1985),

The gist of defendant's testimony at trial was that he
was an assistant to the manager of Eagle Tire, Rick Hansen, who
was the person responsible for Mr. Corona's loss (T. 129-130).
Specifically, he testified that Mr. Hansen directed defendant to
have Mr. Corona rewrite the check initially made payable to
Richard L. Gray (T. 119), wrote the first $10,000 bouncing
reimbursement check to Mr. Corona (T. 133), was present when both
the checks from Mr. Corona were cashed (T. 117-118)/ and met with
Mr. Corona numerous times (T. 125).
At the time of trial/ defendant was aware of Mr.
Hansen's location/ but chose not to call him as a witness (T.
134-135).
Defendant also testified that Gerry Hancey-Hedderick
and her cohort Eddie Stevens were brought in on the loan
arrangements by Mr. Hansen, and that they attended some of the
meetings with Mr. Corona and Mr. Hansen (T. 122-123/ 134).
Defendant testified that he had tried to reach Gerry HanceyHedderick during August/ but that the telephone numbers were "no
good", and that he had made no further efforts to present her
testimony at trial.
Defendant was able to cross-examine Mr. Corona (T. 3268; 75-79)/ and was able to present impeachment evidence against
Mr. Corona through defendant's fatherf who testified that Mr.
Corona had called defendant's father and characterized the
$10/000 transaction as a loan from Mr. Corona to defendant (T.
104).

Defendant was also able to present evidence that when Mr.

Corona contacted Mr. Gray at Valley Bank to find that his loan
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The court found that the prior conviction
would be si gnifleant to impeach the
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defendant's testimony suggesting that he had
not engaged in this type of activity before.
The court acknowledged that the conviction,
nine and a half years earlier, was very
remote in time. As to the defendant's
subsequent history, the record reflected only
that the defendant had used small amounts of
marijuana before he was charged here, and on
the positive side, he had married, had been
regularly employed, and was raising a family.
The district court found that there was some
similarity between the earlier conviction
for delivery of a controlled substance and
the current charge of attempted possession
with intent to distribute. Because the
"critical element" in this case was the
defendant's mental state when he was in
Johansen's house on May 22, the court found
that the defendant's testimony was important,
and because the case came down to the
defendant's word against Johansen's, the
defendant's credibility was "extremely
important."
Id. at 782-783.

See also State v. Schwab, 409 N.W.2d 876,

(Minn.App. 1987)(in trial of sex offense charge, defendant's
prior conviction for sex offense was admissible; nexus to
credibility was sufficient, conviction was one year old,
credibility was a key issue in the case, and defendant "'made no
offer of proof to show what, if anything, more he would testify
about that was not already before the jury.'").
D. If The Trial Court Erred In Admitting Evidence
Of Defendant's Convictions, Such Error Was Harmless.
In the event that this Court chooses to overlook
defendant's waiver of this issue, and follow the format in State
7
v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988)' harmless error analysis
will support the admission of defendant's convictions. The
evidence presented at trial, as discussed in the statement of

See footnotes 1 and 2 of this brief.
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^ ^ i * ^ wlosifiy -* ^uiUunts, t:*c iwllowing comments were

[MR. IWASAKI]: The fact that a witness has been
convicted of a felony and/or convicted of a crime
involving dishonest or false statement i s to be used by
you only i n weighing his credibility,
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortez guilty of thef t 1: y
deception because he's previously been convicted of
theft by deception, and he's previously been convicted
of a communications fraud."
Even though the dates of those convictions are ] ess
than a year apar t in 1985, ai id 1986, and now, 1 le s also
charged in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not the
purpose of the felony convictions. That is to be used
only if you find and believe that such a fact
indicates a person is more likely to te] 1 a falsehood,.
To question his credibility.
I've heard other arguments i i I other cases where it
says, "Well, look if he gets on the stand and has to
admit to those felonies and take the risk of being
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth."
Well, he obviously didn't change his behavior from ] 985
to '86.
MR. GAITHER: 1 ^.» ^wi;.-:; to object,, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained,
MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not believable, .
is a basis for you to look at the prior felony
convictions •
(T. 151- 152)
T l le
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that these comments warrant a reversal ot defendant's convict inn
is set forui in State v
(

i i mi iiji( ztt utah2d 317, 502 P.2d iI3

Because of his advantaged position in
proximity to the trial, and his
responsibility of seeing that the
proceeedings are carried on in the way which
will best serve their purpose of seeking the
truth and doing justice by seeing that both
sides are given a fair trial, the
determination of the propositions just stated
is primarily within the discretion of the
trial court. And the reviewing court should
not reverse unless it appears that clearly
abused his discretion.
Id.

at 114.
This Court explained the two questions that this Court

should use in evaluating defendant's claim that prosecutor's
comments justify a reversal of defendant's convictions, in West
Valley City v. Rislow# 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App. 1987):
[1] did the remarks call to the attention of
the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their
verdict, and [2] were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks.
Id. at 638, quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah2d 54, 513 P.2d 422,
426 (1973).
A. Defendant Has Failed To Carry His Burden In
Raising This Argument.
Inasmuch as defendant has failed to address the second
question posed by this Court in Rislow, Mwere [the jurors]
probably influenced by [the prosecutor's] remarks?", this Court
may choose to reject the entire argument summarily.

See State v.

Dorton, 696 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1985)("In any event, appellant
did not attack the evidence and did not assign insufficiency of
the evidence as error.

Under the generally accepted rule, any

error such as that claimed by appellant here [improper statement
by prosecutor] is harmless.").

See also
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delleiiBe counsel:

Q. Now, you were -- do y on remember w hen you were
arrested and charged foi tin us situation?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And about when was that?

i

A. November.
Q. Of what year?
A. Of 1987.
Q. Now, prior to November of '87, had you been
convicted of prior felonies?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And on or about June 27th of 1987, had you been
convicted of a communications fraud felony?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had you been convicted of a
theft by deception felony?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Had you ever communicated to Mr. Hansen anything
about your criminal record?
A. Yes he knew.
Q. Did he know about that?
A. Yes.
(T. 127-128).
It is also noteworthy that the same evidence was raised
without objection during cross-examination by the prosecution:
Q. And you didn't write out any checks before that
bounced because you can't — was it your testimony that
you can't have a checking account?
A. Yes. [T. 124].
Q. Why is that?
A. That was part of my parole agreement.
Q. Parole agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you've been previously convicted of
communications fraud in June of 1986; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Here in Salt Lake County?
A. Yes.
Q. And then a little bit more than a year later — a
little bit more than a year before, in August — a
little less than a year before in August of '85, you
were convicted of theft by deception?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Both of those felonies?
A. Yes.
Q. Both of those involving crimes regarding
dishonesty?
A. Yes.
Q. And you are on trial today for what crime?
A. Theft by deception.
(T. 133-134).
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police decided to investigate this case;
that's all Mr. Corona decided to tell the
police, [b]ut your burden, as the Judge
instructed, is to go through the evidence and
look at the evidence.
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C. The Jui'oiB Were Probably Not Influenced By The
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circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks":
[Conflicting or circumstantial evidence in
the record would render jurors more
susceptible to influence by improper
argument. But if proof of defendant's guilt
is strong, the challenged conduct or remarks
by the prosecutor will not be presumed
prejudicial.
Id. at 638.
While there was conflict between the State's and
defendant's evidence, the following facts were undisputed:
Defendant told Mr. Corona that he and someone else had recently
purchased Eagle Tire (T. 132), and defendant knew someone who
would help Mr. Corona get a loan to buy a business (T. 116). Mr.
Corona gave defendant two cashier's checks for $5,000, so that he
could obtain a loan (T. 129). Defendant told Mr. Corona that the
advanced funds were to demonstrate Mr. Corona's intention

to

complete the loan transaction, to pay for application process,
and to be refunded, minus the "points" on the loan (T. 8, 10, 1517, 75). Defendant received from Mr. Corona two cashier's checks
for $5,000 each, which were used, with defendant's knowledge,
consent and assistance, for purposes other than obtaining the
loan (T. 118).
While defendant steadfastly maintained at trial that
Rick Hansen received all of the proceeds from the cashier's
checks (T. 131), and that defendant was simply an innocent
"middle man" (T. 130), defendant made arrangements to repay Mr.
Corona, characterizing the $10,000 as a loan from Mr. Corona to
defendant (T. 137-138).

At trial, when the prosecutor asked for
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[MR. IWASAKI]: The fact that a witness has been
convicted of a felony and/or convicted of a crime
involving dishonest or false statement is to be used by
you only in weighing his credibility
I #'m not saying # "Find Mr. Ortez g ail tj ::: i: !i::l , = f t II: y
deception because he '" s previously been convi • ::: I: = " :::I i: f
tl i 3ft by deception, and he's previously been convicted
::: f a communications fraud. "
Even though the dates of those convictions IIH>
less than a year apart in 1985, and 1986, and now, In 's
also charged in 1987 with identical crimes, that is nut
the purpose of the felony convictions. That is to be
used only if you fi nd and believe that such a fact
indicates a person is more likely to tell a falsehood.
To question his credibility.
I've heard other arguments in other cases where it
says, "Well, look if he gets on thee stand and has tc
admit to those felonies and take the risk of being
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth."
Well/ he obviously didrrt change his behavior from i^ltib
to '86
1 13R, GAITHER • 1 am going to object,- y • ::: "' ,II
Honor.
Tl IE COURT: Sustained.
1 IR 1 wASARI i. The testimony is not believable,
and it is a basis for you to look at the prior felony
convictions.

in determining whether or not the jurors were probably influenced
by the comments objected to.

See State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521,

527 (Utah 1983)("An improper argument by defense counsel,
however, may be considered a mitigating factor in determining the
extent of any prejudice that may have occurred.").

Please refer

to discussion of the repeated opportunities taken by the defense
and prosecution to discuss defendant's prior convictions and
credibility, supra pp. 24-26.
Defendant allowed the prosecutor to discuss the
convictions for some time before he objected, and then did not
request an immediate cautionary instruction (T. 151). He waited
until after he finished his own closing argument and the
prosecutor finished his rebuttal to move for a mistrial (T. 174).
These circumstances also weigh against finding prejudicial error
in this case.

Cjf. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-561 and

561 n. 42 (Utah 1987)(failure of defense counsel to object and
move for a mistrial constituted waiver of objection on appeal);
State v. Trusty, 501 P.2d 113, 114-115 (Utah 1972)(lack of
prejudice caused by prosecutor's question is proven by
defendant's failure to object immediately).
Finally, the possible prejudice caused by the
prosecutor's comments was mitigated by the court's instruction.
The jurors were instructed as follows:
You are instructed that the fact that a witness had
been convicted of a felony and/or convicted of any
crime involving dishonesty or false statements is to be
used by you only in weighing his credibility,, and it is
to be so used only if you find and believe that such a
fact indicates a person is more likely to tell a
falsehood.
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evidence should fail on appeal,
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the entire arguments of both counsel, both ol wr-icn

addressed the same relevant issue in veiy similar ways, the Issue
of detendai I
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Uie jurors were repeatedly

instructed about the proper use of evidence of defendant's prior

convictions, this Court should find that defendant's case was
probably not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments.
Defendant's conviction should stand.
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